The third antinomy of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason posits two opposing theses, each of which arrive in paradox when followed to their end. To resolve these paradoxes, Kant argues that our cognitive capacity for making ought claims refers to the freedom of rational agents to make a decision one way or the other, which in turn depends on a non-empirical, conceptual justification. The paradox in causality that Kant finds in the thesis is the result of his belief that time is a linear chain of cause and effect, ascending from past into future. Such a chain is unable to supply all the causes necessary for every kind of effect. Nietzsche does not see any such contradiction in causality because he imagines time as a circle, past running into the future in an eternal recurrence. Nietzsche argues that free will is an illusion, and there is nothing outside of nature.

What Kant refers to as the “law of nature” is the principle that all effects follow directly from a cause prior in time. Nature is defined as all empirical objects, which together make up a consistent, unified totality. These objects are said to be unified because they behave in a manner predictable by science: what they share in common is that they are subject to the laws of nature. One such law is causality. Because time is a condition for the possibility of experience, and the concept of causality is contained within the concept of time, causality is necessary for and universally present in our experience. The law of causality is necessary for our minds to grasp representations as having an identity that persists and changes. Were it otherwise, the law of nature would be a whim of nature, and we could not make accurate scientific predictions. However, when Kant explores causality through his conception of time, in its “unlimited universality” it can’t imagine a first cause and thereby is unable to account for itself.

The chain of cause and effect continues in time ad infinitum; there is no object that is free to behave in a way not conditioned by a prior cause. All past can be written into infinity and all future predicted. Through Kant’s exploration, the necessity of a free agent arises as something spontaneously out of itself. In a universe whose functioning is determined by the assimilation of all experience into a regulated totality, there can be nothing amongst them which acts spontaneously. Any free agent would be outside of this unity - outside nature - outside experience. And yet, if nature cannot account for itself, what can?

Kant’s antinomies refer to a series of contradictions he arrives at by considering the fundamental principles by which the world is governed. These “transcendental ideas” contain paradoxes which only wait to be uncovered by a rational agent with enough integrity to pursue the idea to its end. If such a critique is followed, a system of practical philosophy in greater accord with human nature can be developed by making one in greater accord with all of nature. Lacking sufficient integrity, one can only fall into dogmatically claiming one side or the other is true, despite its inability to be; or one might ignore the matter entirely. The thesis and antithesis posit a rule; their arguments are made by drawing out the position of the other and arriving at a conclusion through its failure.

The third thesis states that there is causality from freedom in addition to natural causality. If we say that causality consists of an effect that is conditioned by a previous cause, and that this series “descends” into time conceived of as a linear continuum, then we will not be able to provide a cause for every effect. Given the fact that our minds take the presence of a cause as a priori when considering an effect, it seems as though our minds themselves violate the law of causality. Infinity is an unbounded process whose meaning is to never have a final instance, and therefore is unable to conceive of the condition that conditions the penultimate condition when descending through time. Whether or not enough data about the universe could really be collected, it should be possible a priori to imagine that we can supply this final condition. But even to have imagined this is to have already thought a contradiction. Contradiction can not be present in nature because nature is a unified whole. Natural causality implies infinity, but requires finitude: it can’t be properly thought without imagining a first cause that starts with no pre-condition. The first cause is freedom: absolute determinism combined with Kant’s picture of time depends on there being an absolutely spontaneous first cause. We know this prime mover exists because the empirical universe exists; however, for this cause to be free, it must be of an order such that it can not be experienced. Yet simultaneously, the prime mover seems to be in a causal relationship with appearances.

The antithesis of the third antinomy states that there is nothing but natural causality, and it begins, as with the thesis, by stretching the opposite position until it breaks. For experience to constitute a unified whole, it must be held together by the law of cause and effect. Transcendental freedom supposes that there exists a moment that happens without being caused by a prior effect. If this freedom is embodied in the same object governed by the laws of nature, then causality becomes contingent and the unity of experience is broken. If this were the case, it would be evident in science, and another basis for practical philosophy would be required lest it wander into nihilism. Since experience does, in fact, constitute a unified whole, transcendental freedom can only be said to refer to an order that cannot be experienced, and is therefore “an empty thought-entity.” For experience to be represented as a consistent whole, no exceptions to the laws of nature may be admitted as being possible within experience. However, having just established the grounds for causality, if we refer to the argument for the thesis we have a few options: as stated above, we might dogmatically insist that one side is true, and ignore its contradictory aspects; we can turn our back to the situation entirely; or we can search for a resolution.

Kant is able to gain insights into the nature of experience, and the world to which our experience refers, entirely by observing how our minds operate. His resolution of the above contradiction depends on distinguishing between the different grounds normative and descriptive judgments refer to as their basis for being true. A descriptive proposition about nature is either true or false based on empirically verifiable reasons. A normative “ought” proposition has no experience to which it can refer; it depends on concepts. Since something that ought to happen has never happened, we cannot point to an experience to say why our ought claim is true. All we can point to is a concept (of how things ought to be). Making an ought claim about nature is nonsensical, because the grounds for saying ought rely a priori on the possibility for it to have been otherwise. Nature is absolutely determined by causality; it is not possible for any natural phenomena to be other than it is. An ought statement can only be meaningfully applied to rational agents, and this application itself indicates an a priori knowledge of their freedom to choose. It is in the moment of choice that the “character” of the free agent, unknowable in experience, becomes intelligible. The “intelligible character” are the behavioural tendencies of an agent which does not pertain to our experience. It may not be possible to make precise insights into the nature of the free agent, but an outline around it can be drawn. With enough information, it is possible to predict the choice of any rational agent, since they are empirical phenomena and their choices will be subject to causality. However, Kant locates the moment of choice as the point where we can discern the spontaneity of the free agent.

Kant’s problem with causality, and the resolution he invents depend on a conception of time as a straight line with all the moments prior to X being given. When he explores the law of causality from this framework, time descends infinitely into the past. However, because causality is necessary for experience, and because the concept “effect” contains a priori the concept “cause,” we should be able to hypothetically know the cause of every effect. Yet the nature of infinity is such that to know it completely is for it to be finite. This is the impossible contradiction which demands a free agent be posited to resolve it. If we follow Nietzsche (and many ancient traditions) and say that time is a circle, we avoid this contradiction, and are spared the extra step of having to justify freedom. If past and future run into each other, it becomes hypothetically possible to collect all data about this closed universe, and to say with precision how every single effect is caused.

A natural first question to ask of such a metaphysics is what brought this circle into being. One might respond that the first cause is a moment to which we can point, but because past and future exist at the same time, this point is incorporated seamlessly into the turning of the wheel and we do not need to look for an unconditioned cause. In both of the conceptions of time outlined above, we are relying on spatial figures in a way that is not merely a visual metaphor, as we tend to in other areas of philosophy. Another question to ask of our metaphysician of the eternal return, is whether the line and the circle are mathematically distinct, and how the category of space might relate to them. At this early stage, it seems as though, by eliminating the need for a free agent, the eternal return results in fewer necessary propositions than Kant’s transcendental philosophy and is therefore to be favoured by Kant’s own critical method. However, whether or not this is true remains to be seen as we explore the ramifications of our new model, and relate it to space and other aspects of our experience. Such an investigation is beyond the scope of this essay.

Nietzsche’s most famous formulation of the eternal return is as a thought experiment that he uses to determine whether we are living a life of quality. This question is healthy food for thought, but a more pressing question, far more urgent than fleshing out a comprehensive metaphysical model, is: on what basis can we hold people accountable for their actions? From the view of strict causality for which we have just argued, the fate of every human is written in stone from the beginning of the universe; how do we hold people responsible, since none of us have anything resembling choice? Now we are faced with the daunting task of developing a foundation for practical philosophy, lest we fall into black nihilism.

At first glance, it seems apparent that the concepts of freedom and causality can not be held in the same hand. It is likely that Kant’s valiant struggle to resolve these two poles was motivated by an awareness of the danger of nihilism. Between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and his critical method, our first priority should be to ally ourselves with the latter; if we are for the system over the method, then we begin to dogmatically follow the anti-dogmatist. Caught in the wake of Nietzsche’s creative power, I have convinced myself of the supremacy of the law of nature, and I am now lost in void. I have no ground to stand on; the only illumination is the appealing glow of exploring what it means to conceive of time as a circle; but this task seems to emanate a light that is purely creative, an art of rhetoric and not a true means to find orientation from within the void.