Thread: You could be Phineas Gage, minus the massive brain injury

The question then must be, is "conscience" in the sense you've described here (the faculty used to guess at how others will perceive our actions) the same thing as "conscience" in the colloquial sense. I think it's clear that it isn't. The sort of "conscience" you're talking about seems to be nothing more than the ability to think things through to their logical conclusion and accurately surmise how other people will react to your actions. A purely intellectual or calculating faculty, with no moral dimension at all. Simply weighing pro against con, or looking beyond immediate advantages to see more distant drawbacks.

A person could lack any sort of "conscience" in the colloquial sense--a sense of moral shame, a sense of right and wrong--but still be perfectly able to make use of the faculty that you're calling "conscience". For instance, unless a person is mentally defective, they could probably deduce that killing another person would have negative effects (imprisonment, etc.) that would outweigh the immediate benefits no matter how advantageous those might be. But making that determination isn't "conscience" in the normal sense of the word. A person who has "conscience" in the normal sense of the word would refrain from murder not because the cons outweigh the pros, but because they think it's morally wrong. So while the definition of "conscience" you're using here may be the proper one within the context of modern psychology, it seems to differ substantially from the normal common-usage meaning, and doesn't seem to be very relevant to the OP.

TLDR: Gwahir is asking whether you'd give up your moral inhibitions against treating others badly, not your ability to make rational cost-benefit judgment calls like "murdering this guy would get me thrown in jail so it's not worth it", or "drinking my roommates milk would cause him to become angry at me". Any non-retarded person can still make those judgment calls even if they have no moral inhibitions against murder or milk theft or whatever else.

Originally Posted by Syme

Right, but it's a reason not to push the button in the first place. When you are standing there debating whether to push it, you obviously can't view the decision in the way you'd view it after pushing the button.

But see, a consequentialist can view any and every situation that way. Look at the circumstances after the event and make a judgment about whether they will be better than the circs before it.

I understand that your pre-button conscience wants to prohibit you from doing something that will result in immoral and harmful actions. But consciences are only mildly prohibitive; it's more accurate to describe them as punitive. It's not hard to disobey your conscience -- it's just, let's say, unpleasant. You feel horrible doing it. But you could make yourself feel horrible for an instant in order to make you feel great for the rest of your life. Indeed, that makes a lot of sense. Therefore it actually doesn't make much sense to follow what your pre-button self's conscience tells you to do. What I'm saying is not that you should press the button. What I'm saying is that "my conscience does not want me to do it" is not a very good reason not to.

Ultimately, it should be obvious to any rational being that there are reasons other than "that we have a conscience" to be morally good. Having a conscience is not a necessary (though it is, in a sense, sufficient) reason to act morally.

Originally Posted by gwahir

But see, a consequentialist can view any and every situation that way. Look at the circumstances after the event and make a judgment about whether they will be better than the circs before it.

I think this is maybe a bit different though, because the event itself crucially changes the standard by which you evaluate circumstances. To pre-button me, the circumstances after I push the button AREN'T better; they are worse, because they entail me acting in ways that I, pre-button Syme, don't want to act. To post-button Syme, who would have no qualms about acting in those ways, those may indeed be better circumstances. But he ain't me.

To expand on my answer, though, I also don't feel that I need to be entirely without guilt/shame/conscience to get where I want to get in life in the first place. So even if I was okay with the person who I'd become after pushing the button, I wouldn't feel much of a desire to.

Originally Posted by gwahir

I understand that your pre-button conscience wants to prohibit you from doing something that will result in immoral and harmful actions. But consciences are only mildly prohibitive; it's more accurate to describe them as punitive. It's not hard to disobey your conscience -- it's just, let's say, unpleasant.

I think you may find that when it comes to certain things, certain people will find the strictures of their conscience more than mildly prohibitive. When it comes to certain things, some people would even rather die than do what they think is wrong.

Originally Posted by gwahir

You feel horrible doing it. But you could make yourself feel horrible for an instant in order to make you feel great for the rest of your life. Indeed, that makes a lot of sense. Therefore it actually doesn't make much sense to follow what your pre-button self's conscience tells you to do.

Again, for myself personally, I'm not really convinced that being conscience-free would make me feel great for the rest of my life (that presupposes that real joy is nothing but the absence of shame/guilt), and that it's not possible for me to lead a life I'm happy with unless I have no conscience. I'm not convinced that an unlimited capacity for guilt-free scheming and scamming is the ticket to a life of happiness.

Originally Posted by gwahir

What I'm saying is that "my conscience does not want me to do it" is not a very good reason not to.

I wouldn't say "my conscience does not want me to do it"; that seems to imply that there's some discrete entity in my head, separate from the "real" or "core" me, trying to make me act in ways that the real/core me might not want to. I don't really see it that way. It's not that my conscience doesn't want me to do it. I don't want to do it. My desire not to do it isn't being imposed on me from the outside. It comes from within my mind just as much as any other desire or thought I have.

Originally Posted by gwahir

Ultimately, it should be obvious to any rational being that there are reasons other than "that we have a conscience" to be morally good. Having a conscience is not a necessary (though it is, in a sense, sufficient) reason to act morally.

My own view, if I was asked for it, is that ANY behavior according to moral principles isn't rational. Any person who sets for themselves (or accepts from others) genuine moral principles, who really honestly bases their actions on ideas about what's right and wrong, isn't being rational. I don't think there's any way that ideas about right and wrong can be supported rationally. This doesn't mean I don't still have ideas about right and wrong, of course. But I don't pretend that I arrived at them by some rational process.