No need for examples, I know what you're talking about. Once the war had begun, I don't think it's hard to understand why they would continue arguing that there might be WMDs even after it came out that the initial analysis was bad. "Ass-covering" and "doctrinal inertia" are two phrases that come to mind. Obviously, at that point, it was irresponsible and reprehensible of them to continue trying to justify their pointless war with the obviously bogus WMD excuse; I'm not saying that the administration acted acceptably with regard to the WMD scare, I'm just saying that there was never a point before the war where George Bush knew that the Iraqis had no WMDs and decided to go ahead and invade them anyhow. It's unfortunate that the facts of the pre-war drumup have been simplified to the fact that people have that view. He uncritically accepted analysis to that effect, but that's not the same thing as knowing it was wrong. The information revealing the problems in the WMD theory did not percolate up to his level, which is one of the major intelligence failings that the Senate intel commitee identified with the CIA's dissemination practices in 2002-2003.
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