Sorry, I didn't mean to sound condescending, but I recognise that I did.
If you're saying that the philosophically relevant difference between god and pink unicorns is physical-being-ness, in response to the point that there's no evidence for either and therefore both are as likely as each other (to put it all simply), you're saying that, because god isn't a physical being, it doesn't require evidence to be a convincing proposition.
I'm not saying it "doesn't fit into your belief structure", I just meant to say that while I find your beliefs and arguments interesting and compelling, I don't think this is a sound objection. Unless there's some reason that physical-being-ness is a philosophically relevant difference that I have just missed and can't see, which is also entirely possible. But then you'll have to explain that.
KT.: occam's (/ockham's/however you spell it) razor is kind of my point. If there's no reason to believe X exists, and you have a system that can coherently (logically) and feasibly (physically) function without it, the reasonable position to take is to say X does not exist. If you, as I say, insist on splitting hairs and feel it's necessary to say "X MIGHT exist, because technically we can't prove it doesn't", you also need to say that about everything for which there is no evidence. If you need to remain "open" to the idea of a god, you also, logically, must remain just as "open" to the idea that Satan is messing with our GPSes and instruments and even our consciousnesses to trick us into thinking the Earth is flat. Or the idea that, though our inference may seem strong, our conclusions about "round Earth theory" are simply incorrect.
THAT is why I have so little patience for people who say "you can't disprove god any more than you can prove it, so both positions are illogical".
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